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ALTERING THE CONTOURS OF COPYRIGHT-
THE DMCA AND THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
OF PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP. V. 321 STUDIOS
Arnold P. Lutzker & Susan J. Lutzkert
I. INTRODUCTION
In Eldred v. Ashcroft ("Eldred")' the United States Supreme
Court, upholding the constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act ("CTEA"),2 stated that "copyright law contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations" in the form of the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense.3 When faced
with a legislative restriction that arguably chills the exercise of free
speech, the Eldred Court said these safeguards render further First
Amendment scrutiny unnecessary unless Congress seeks to alter the
traditional contours of copyright protection.4 In Paramount Pictures
Corp. v. 321 Studios,5 the Second Circuit rejected, without comment,
t Founding Partners, Lutzker, Lutzker & Settlemyer LLP, Washington, D.C.,
(www.lutzker.com). The authors wish to acknowledge the major role played by Lutzker,
Lutzker & Settlemyer attorneys Carl Settlemyer and Allison Rapp in representing 321 Studios
before the Copyright Office in the § 1201 proceeding and in the New York litigation and in
commenting on this article. In addition, the authors are indebted to the work of Michael H. Page
and Daralyn J. Durie of Keker and Van Nest, LLP, San Francisco, California, who represented
321 Studios in the California litigation. They developed defenses for 321 Studios that formed a
foundation for its defense in the New York litigation. John M. Brickman of Ackerman, Levine,
Cullen, Brickman & Limmer, LLP, Great Neck, New York, was also of indispensable assistance
in the New York litigation.
1. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2000). The CTEA, enacted in 1998, added twenty years to
the copyright term. In Eldred a group of educators, publishers, and artists brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of the law, alleging inter alia, that it violated the "limited
times" prescription of the Copyright Clause ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times... the exclusive Right to
their ... Writings .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the CTEA, Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir.
2001), and the Supreme Court affirmed, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
3. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
4. Id. at 221.
5. No. 04-1360 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2004) (order denying stay of injunction pending
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the motion from a software distributor, 321 Studios, for an emergency
stay of a preliminary injunction issued by the District Court for the
Southern District of New York against the distribution of 321
Studios' DVD backup and recovery software.6 321 Studios requested
a stay pending consideration of two constitutional questions: (i)
whether the anti-trafficking provisions of § 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")7 impermissibly
altered the contours of copyright, effectively curtailing appropriate
fair uses of digital works protected by technological measures, and
(ii) whether the DMCA invalidates the constitutional limitation on the
term of copyright by prohibiting the manufacture and sale of tools
needed to exploit works protected by technological protection
measures after the copyright term expires. Because the District Court
relied explicitly (as had the District Court for the Northern District of
California in 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc. )8 on the Second
Circuit's opinion in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley ("Corley")9
without consideration of the implications of Eldred, only a higher
court review could have altered the analysis.'(
By failing to accept 321 Studios' emergency plea for a stay
pending full consideration of the merits, the Second Circuit lost the
chance to take into account the impact of the intervening holding in
Eldred as well as significant facts that distinguished the New York
Litigation from Corley. The Second Circuit, to the profound
misfortune of 321 Studios and loss to the general public, let stand a
less than trenchant opinion of the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA in the face of a record that showed that consumers were being
denied the tools to make fair uses of copyrighted works and
unrestricted use of public domain works. The result is a chilling of
activity that is privileged under the First Amendment and a validation
appeal).
6. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004). This suit is sometimes referred to hereinafter as the "New
York Litigation."
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
8. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See infra
Part V.A. This suit is sometimes referred to hereinafter as the "California Litigation."
9. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Corley was the third in a series of three related cases.
The first two were Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) ("Reimerdes F') and Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Reimerdes IF"). These cases are discussed infra Part V.C.2.
10. 321 Studios' business was so devastated by the effects of the lower court injunctions
and the costs of the six lawsuits in which it was involved that it was forced to close down and
therefore could not prosecute its appeals to the Second and Ninth Circuit courts. See infra Part
V.C.6.
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of a mechanism that can confer perpetual copyright status on public
domain works. Too late to help 321 Studios, a bill that would have
altered this result by restoring the fair use defense for digital works
was introduced, but died with the end of the 108th Congress."'
II. 321 STUDIOS
In 2001, Robert Moore and Rob Semaan founded Terr, LLC, a
company based in St. Louis, Missouri that did business as 321
Studios. The mission of the company was to provide software tools
to help consumers protect their investment in digital media. Until it
was forced out of business by no fewer than six separate lawsuits and
two federal court injunctions, it was the leading provider of DVD
backup, recovery, and creation software. 321 Studios had distributors
and sales offices throughout Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the United
States, and its premier DVD backup title, DVD X Copy Platinum,
was one of PC Magazine's "Best Products of 2003. ''12
Despite the popularity of its products with consumers, 321
Studios found itself at the center of a legal struggle to establish that its
DVD-copying software did not violate U.S. copyright law.
Ultimately, 321 Studios was driven out of business before the serious
constitutional questions that were raised by its products could receive
full appellate consideration in court. The story of the 321 litigation
must be told against the history of the DMCA and, specifically, of its
rules regulating access to digital works.
III. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Background and Legislative History
The right to control access to digital works was at the heart of
the digital debate that began when the Clinton Administration took
office in 1993 and attempted to bring a new order to the use of the
Internet as an international communications medium. The debate
culminated in 1998 in the enactment of the DMCA.
In 1994, the National Information Infrastructure ("Nil") Task
Force, which was spearheaded by the Department of Commerce
11. Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (1st Sess.
2003). See infra Part VI.C.
12. See Press Release, 321 Studios, PC Magazine Names DVD X Copy
PLATINUM(TM) As One of the Best Products of 2003 (Jan. 6, 2004) (on file with the Santa
Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal). For a more complete description of 321
Studios' DVD-copying software products, see infra Part IV.
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("DOC"), published a Green Paper calling for public input on the
need for expanded regulation of the digital environment.13 In
fulfilling its responsibilities, the DOC, led by the Commissioner of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), held public hearings
and initiated a Conference on Fair Use ("CONFU") designed to
develop guidelines for use of copyrighted works in numerous
educational settings. 14 Following many hours of hearings and receipt
of reams of public comments, in 1995 the NII Task Force released
The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights.15
The Report, dubbed the White Paper, stressed that U.S. copyright law
was substantially fit for handling most important issues in the digital
context; however, in the words of the White Paper, like a well-worn
coat, some tailoring was needed to keep it fitting just right. 16 Among
its core recommendations was the creation of new prohibitions on
devices or services designed to circumvent technological
mechanisms, which protect the rights of copyright owners and which
affect newly recognized copyright management information.17
There was much public discussion about the copyright issues
raised in the White Paper and continued hearings in Congress and
meetings of CONFU focused on how U.S. copyright law should be
reformed. At the conclusion of 1996, a Diplomatic Conference was
held in Geneva under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") to consider, inter alia, amendments to the
Berne Treaty' 8 along the lines set forth in the Nil Report in order to
13. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
3 (September 1995) (citing INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (July 1994)).
14. For additional background on CONFU, see Association of Research Libraries,
Conference On "'Fair Use" Of Copyrighted Works Concludes Without Consensus; Educators,
Scholars, Librarians To Explore Next Steps (1998), at
http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/confustate.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
15. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(September 1995).
16. Id. at 212.
17. Id. at 230-31.
18. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris 1971),
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/beme/trtdocs-woOOl.html, is the leading
international copyright treaty. In 1976, the United States began a process of stripping copyright
law of required formalities and making other changes necessary to conform to the Berne
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develop an international consensus on treatment of copyright in a
digital world. WIPO adopted a series of amendments to the Berne
Treaty (the "WIPO Treaty"), 19 and as a signatory to the Berne Treaty,
the U.S. Congress had to approve the WIPO Treaty and implement
any changes in U.S. law needed to conform its statutes to Berne.
Consideration of the changes to U.S. copyright law framed the
Congressional debate. Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, renamed the implementing legislation for the
WIPO Treaty "The Digital Millennium Copyright Act,, 20 thereby
stressing its importance for U.S. copyright policy. The bill was the
focal point of all legislative debate on copyright issues, including
anti-circumvention. Specifically, at the top of the diplomatic agenda
for conforming U.S. law to Berne was a statutory change that would
declare anyone unlawfully accessing a digital copyrighted work
protected by a technological protection measure ("TPM") to be civilly
and criminally liable for infringement.
Copyright owners sought a ban on circumvention that would
both prevent the manufacture and sale of devices that could
technologically open the digital locks and at the same time make an
individual's action of circumvention unlawful as well. Opponents of
a ban on circumvention argued that the changes would decimate the
decades-old balance in copyright law that allowed for an opportunity
to engage in independent criticism, scholarship and teaching. If
access could be technologically restricted by the copyright owner,
they reasoned, how could the public exercise fair use with regard to
those works?
In the end Congress sided with the copyright owners, concluding
that the threat of digital theft facing copyright owners was far greater
than any they had faced in a generation. The resulting legislation,
found in § 1201 of the Copyright Act, 21 has three primary
prohibitions. Section 1201(a)(1) prohibits any person from
circumventing a TPM, which effectively controls access to a
copyrighted work without authorization of the copyright owner.
22
Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits manufacturing and trafficking in tools
that enable circumvention of a TPM to obtain unauthorized access to
Convention. The United States acceded to Berne in 1989.
19. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright
and Neighboring Rights Questions, Geneva, Switzerland, Dec. 20, 1996, available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm.
20. S. 2037, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998).
21. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 1, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1998).
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protected works, while § 1201(b) prohibits manufacturing and
trafficking in tools that bypass TPMs which effectively protect a
copyright holder's statutory rights. 23
B. Section 1201
The prohibition in § 1201(a)(1)(A) reads in pertinent part: "No
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title. 24 The prohibition
in § 1201(a)(2) reads as follows:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use
other than to circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert
with that person with that person's knowledge for use in
circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title.
25
The prohibition in § 1201(b) reads as follows:
Additional violations. (1) No person shall manufacture, import,
offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or-produced for the purpose of
circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure
that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
23. Id. § 1201(a)(2); Id. § 1201(b).
24. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
25. Id. § 1201(a)(2). The phrases "primarily designed" and "limited commercially
significant purpose," which appear in §§ 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) were carefully crafted with
an eye toward the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Sony Betamax case. Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ("Sony"). The Supreme Court
in that case held that video recorders have "substantial non-infringing uses," and, that, therefore,
Sony's sale of such equipment to the general public did not constitute contributory copyright
infringement. Id. at 456. Although the computer equipment industry lobbied for a Sony-
standard to be used in § 1201, Congress opted for the stricter standard. It was clear even at the
time the DMCA was passed that this standard would give rise to legal challenges.
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this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use
other than to circumvent protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert
with that person with that person's knowledge for use in
circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure
that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof.
26
To placate those concerned about the broad sweep of the rules,
Congress crafted several compromises.
1. Library of Congress Triennial Proceedings
The Report accompanying the House Commerce Committee's
version of the DMCA bill stated:
Given the threat of a diminution of otherwise lawful access to
works and information, the Committee on Commerce believes that
a 'fail-safe" mechanism is required. This mechanism would
monitor developments in the marketplace for copyrighted
materials, and allow the enforceability of the prohibition against
the act of circumvention to be selectively waived, for limited time
periods, if necessary to prevent a diminution in the availability to
individual users of a particular category of copyrighted materials.
Section 102(a)(1) of the bill creates such a mechanism. It converts
the statutory prohibition against the act of circumvention into a
regulation, and creates a rulemaking proceeding in which the issue
of whether enforcement of the regulation should be temporarily
waived with regard to particular categories of works can be fully
considered and fairly decided on the basis of real marketplace
developments that may diminish otherwise lawful access to
works.
Accordingly, Congress delayed implementation of the §
1201(a)(1) prohibition for two years and provided that during that
two-year period and each succeeding three-year period the Librarian
of Congress would supervise a regulatory process to determine
26. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1998).
27. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998,
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998) (emphasis added).
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whether access to particular classes of works protected by anti-
circumvention technology should nevertheless be allowed to facilitate
fair use and other copyright law limitations7. 8  After the initial two-
year study by the Copyright Office, completed in October 2000, the
Librarian determined that only two specific classes of works should
be exempt from anti-circumvention restrictions. The first exempt
class consisted of compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked
by filtering software applications.2 9  The second exempt class,
relevant to the concerns of 321 Studios, was literary works, including
computer programs and databases, protected by access control
mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction,
damage, or obsolescence.3
2. Statutory Exemptions
The second compromise was a group of explicit exceptions to
the anti-circumvention rules. These exemptions allowed, under
certain specified conditions, circumvention of TPMs for purposes of
(i) browsing by nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational
institutions;3 1  (ii) law enforcement, intelligence, and other
28. Section 1201(a)(1)(B) provides that the anticircumvention prohibition
shall not apply to persons who are users of a copyrighted work which is in a
particular class of works, if such persons are, or are likely to be in the succeeding
3-year period, adversely affected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to
make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works ....
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(B) (1998). In conducting the rulemaking, the Librarian is to examine
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works; (ii) the availability for use of
works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) the
impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures
applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect of circumvention of
technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works; and (v)
such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
29. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,562 (Oct. 27, 2000) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
30. Id. The 2003 rulemaking proceeding is discussed infra Part V.B. It should be noted
that fair use is specifically identified as a concern in the Librarian's Statement accompanying
the 2000 rulemaking: "I want.., to stress the importance to the nation of preserving the
principle of 'fair use' in the digital age," and, pointing to a need for statutory change
demonstrated by the rulemaking: "I will ask that Congress consider developing more
appropriate criteria for assessing the harm that could be done to American creativity by the anti-
circumvention provision of the statute." Statement of James H. Billington, Librarian of
Congress, on Section 1201(a)(l) Rulemaking (Oct. 27, 2000) (on file with the Santa Clara
Computer & High Technology Law Journal).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d). Qualifying public institutions are permitted to circumvent TPMs
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government activities; 32 (iii) reverse engineering; 33 (iv) encryption
research;34  (v) detecting and disabling personally identifying
information,35  and (vi) security testing.36  A separate complex
provision addresses the treatment of TPMs on analog devices.
37
3. Incorporation of Fair Use Concern
The DMCA does reference fair use and other statutory
limitations as qualifications on the rights set forth in § 1201. In §
1201(c)(1) Congress provided that "[n]othing in this section shall
affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under this title. 38  That is, once
lawful access is obtained, the other limitations and defenses of
copyright law (including fair use) and the Constitution come into
play.39 In short, § 1201 does not, on its face, diminish fair use
to gain access to a copyrighted work solely in order to make a good faith determination whether
to acquire a copy of the work or not. This accessed copy cannot be retained longer than
necessary to make the acquisition determination and may not be usedfor any other purpose, and
the work must not be otherwise reasonably available in any form. Violations of the limitation
will subject the nonprofit to civil damages, and repetitive violations can result in loss of the
exemption. The exemption is not a justification to traffic in prohibited equipment. A central
question not answered by the DMCA is how a qualified library can obtain the means to
circumvent if the selling of equipment is prohibited under the ban on infringing devices.
32. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 1, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (1998).
33. 17 U.S.C. §1201(f). A lawful user of a computer program may circumvent TPMs to
ensure that the program can work with other programs (interoperability) provided there is no
readily available commercial alternative for that purpose. The research may be shared with
others, as long as it does not constitute a copyright infringement of the original or related work.
34. Id. § 1201(g). Circumvention is permitted in the context of "good faith encryption
research" with respect to copies lawfully acquired. Persons availing themselves of this
exemption must have tried to get permission of the original owner and cannot engage in
practices deemed a violation of computer fraud laws.
35. Id. § 1201(i). Circumvention is permitted to detect and disable technology that
collects and then distributes information about an online subscriber that was not authorized by
the subscriber.
36. Id. § 12010). Circumvention is permitted for good faith efforts to access a computer
system or network (with permission of the network owner) to investigate and correct a security
flaw.
37. After a phase-in period, the law requires compliance by analog recording device
manufacturers with anti-copy technologies that do not affect the playability of the machines or
restrict lawful activities. Id. § 1201(k).
38. Id. § 1201(c)(1).
39. That the role of fair use was to continue unimpeded with respect to works for which a
user has obtained lawful access is clear from the legislative history. As noted by the Register of
Copyrights,
Today, the fair use doctrine plays a critical role in calibrating an appropriate
balance between the rights of copyright owners and the interests of users of
copyrighted works. It modifies the grant of private ownership rights by allowing
certain beneficial and reasonable uses of works without the copyright owner's
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entitlements of users who have obtained lawful access to a work
protected by a TPM. However, this provision does not address the
question of how one can obtain fair use of works where lawful access
has not first been obtained. Nor does it ensure that tools needed to
copy a digital work protected by a TPM will be available even for
those with lawful access. In other words, § 1201(c) has no bearing on
whether § 1201 recognizes fair use as a defense to circumvention.
IV. 321 STUDIOS' PRODUCTS AND THE LEGAL ISSUES THEY
RAISED
A. The Need for the Software
In the last five years DVDs have become the medium of choice
for distribution of motion pictures. While VHS tapes are still
available, many movie titles are sold only on DVD, and the VHS
format, once the backbone of the home entertainment rental market, is
being phased out. At the same time consumers are, at considerable
expense, building DVD movie libraries. New DVD titles are a staple
of commerce, marketed by eager movie studio executives as an
indestructible medium.4° In the face of this marketing pitch, a basic
reality has been observed: DVDs are in fact a more fragile medium
than originally thought. During routine use, they are 'susceptible to
being scratched, chipped and broken, as well as damaged by light and
heat, rendering them partially if not completely unusable.41 Rather
consent. Fair use should continue to play this critical role in the digital
environment, both today and as technology evolves in the future.
Answers Concerning the National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act (H.R.
2441 and S. 1284) Prepared by Marybeth Peters, The Register of Copyrights, submitted to the
Honorable Carlos J. Moorhead, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, (Feb.
15, 1996), at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/niistat.html.
However, the fair use doctrine was markedly constricted with respect to works for
which lawful access was not secured with permission of the copyright owner.
40. The Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 108th Cong., May 12, 2004 ("2004
Hearing") (testimony of Jack Valenti, President and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture
Association of America), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/1 08/Hearings/5 122004hearingl265/Valentil987.htm.
41. DVDs are highly susceptible to mechanical failure, particularly failure caused by
delamination and oxidization. See, e.g., Douglas Dixon, "DVD Rot"/DVD Longevity and
Reliability (Sept. 2003), at http://www.manifest-tech.com/mediadvd/dvd_compatibility.htm.
See also Fred R. Byers, Care and Handling of CDs and DVDs-A Guide for Librarians and
Archivists, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY SPECIAL PUBLICATION
500-252 vi, 11 (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div895/carefordisc/CDandDVDCareandHandlingGuide.pdf. This 2003
study by the National Institute of Standards and Technology confirmed that the longevity and
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than hearing movie distributors expressing concern for their
customers' expensive DVD movie collections, the public is often told
that there is no return or exchange policy on DVDs, leaving many
owners of damaged DVDs the choice of either repurchasing DVD
movies at full retail price (assuming they are still available), watching
flawed versions of programs or missing works entirely. As these
market realities were playing out, 321 Studios developed its software
products to offer the public a practical way to preserve DVD movie
collections, relying on its good faith belief that consumers are entitled
to protect their investment in DVD movies by making backup use
copies.
321 Studios' first generation product was called DVD Copy
Plus, which allowed consumers to copy the video and sound content
42
of a DVD onto a CD. It consisted of an electronic guide explaining
how to create backup copies of DVDs, bundled with two pieces of
previously publicly available software which could be fully
downloaded from Internet websites and included with DVD Copy
Plus as a convenience, and a licensed CD burning application.43 By
the time of the California Litigation,44 it had been largely replaced in
the market by DVD X Copy, a more sophisticated product, which
allowed consumers to make an archival DVD backup copy of an
original DVD, including original menus and special features, and also
to recover data from DVDs that had been scratched or damaged.45 All
of 321 Studios' DVD-copying products are referred to hereinafter as
the "321 Software."
B. DVD Access Controls
Access to many DVDs is controlled by a format called the
Content Scramble System ("CSS"), which is an access control
system. 46 CSS was developed in the mid-1990s at the behest of the
durability problems reported by DVD users are both real and economically significant.
42. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Subsequently 321 Studios introduced enhanced versions of DVD X Copy; namely,
DVD X Copy Gold, DVD X Copy Platinum and DVD X Copy Express. All these products
worked essentially in the same manner as DVD X Copy, but had some additional features and
functionality, e.g., different data compression methods and DVD burning engines.
46. Whether CSS is an effective copy control system remains controversial. Although
Judge Kaplan found it to be in Reimerdes II, the Second Circuit reserved judgment on the matter
in Corley. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 438 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001).
According to experts, while CSS does not prevent the content of a CSS-protected DVD from
being copied, the copy would not be useful because it would be missing the CSS "lock" that
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motion picture industry, which was not willing to release movies in
digital form without protection against the risk of piracy. 47 CSS is
used to encrypt video content regardless of its copyright status. Thus,
some CSS-encrypted DVDs embody works in the public domain,
including video works that were never protected by copyright (works
for which copyright protection has expired and works of the U.S.
Government).48
CSS uses a mathematical algorithm and a set of electronic
"keys" to encrypt the contents of the DVD. The technology is
licensed to the manufacturers of DVD players under a scheme
administered by the DVD Copyright Control Authority. However, all
thirty-one CSS keys and the algorithm that can be used to decode a
DVD are publicly available on the Internet.49 Just like any licensed
DVD player, the 321 Software works by using these keys to read
CSS-encoded data and then using the well known CSS algorithm to
decode the data.5°
C. 321 Studios'Anti-Piracy Measures
In contrast to the statutory standard in § 1201(a)(2)(A) and (B)
and § 1201 (b)(1)(A) and (B),51 321 Studios characterized its software
as multi-functional and multi-purposedY The 321 Software was
enables the content to be accessed and viewed. See, e.g., Declaration of Robert W. Schumann
In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 22, Paramount Pictures Corp.
v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004).
47. Corley, 273 F.3d at 436.
48. 321 Studios introduced evidence regarding such works before the Copyright Office
and in the New York Litigation. As discussed infra Part V.C.2, this evidence was a factor
distinguishing the New York Litigation from Corley.
49. In September 1999, Jon Johansen, a Norwegian teenager, figured out how to crack the
CSS code. Dubbed DeCSS, his code-cracking program traded throughout the universe of
computer hackers. The movie and recording industry launched legal challenges to the DeCSS
program, successfully prevailing against defendants by persuading the courts that DeCSS
violated the anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201. One of these defendants was Reimerdes.
See infra Part V.C.2. In 2004, a court in Norway found Johansen innocent of criminal copyright
infringement under Norwegian law. William Stoichevski, Norway's DVD Hacker Acquitted
Again, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 23, 2003, at 8.
50. See 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
51. The prohibitions apply to tools "primarily designed... for the purpose of
circumventing" or that have "only limited commercially significant purpose ... other than to
circumvent." 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(1)(A)-(B) (1998).
52. 321 Studios' customers use its software for diverse purposes. Examples supplied to
321 Studios in hundreds of declarations from its customers included the following: a medical
physicist inserts clips from popular movies into training tapes for radioactive patients and
nursing staff; a father edits out material he deems inappropriate for his children, including
removing R-rated and unrated materials from DVDs containing films rated for children, and a
woodworker copies instructional videos so that they will play on his computer DVD drive.
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promoted to enable consumers to make backups of lawfully-
purchased DVDs for private, archival-not Internet-sharing-
purposes, to repair damaged DVDs, and to reproduce homemade
digital files. Further, 321 Studios adopted a set of anti-piracy
measures to minimize the chances that its products would be used for
infringing purposes. These measures included the following: (i)
requiring users to register to activate its software (after registration,
every backup copy is "watermarked" so that it can be traced to a
registered user, and every copy contains an indelible notice stating it
is for private, backup purposes only and not for sale); (ii)
automatically erasing content from a computer as it copies to a
recordable DVD, preventing storage on a hard drive; (iii) embedding
a digital semaphore or bit flag in each copy to prevent serial copying
using the 321 Software; (iv) including educational information about
copyright in the packaging and requiring compliance with the law in
its End User License Agreement, and (v) disabling users believed to
be infringing copyrights.53
The principals of 321 Studios acknowledged that the 321
Software did not prevent unauthorized copying. Users could make
multiple copies of a single work one at a time, or, using other
software, users could copy a backup DVD. However, as every
backup is marked with an indelible disclaimer, the copy could not be
sold as an original. As further evidence of its bonafides, 321 Studios
publicly committed to pay a $10,000 reward for information leading
to conviction of anyone who used the 321 Software to market
bootlegged DVDs 54 and offered to work with the movie studios on
additional technological fixes designed to minimize unauthorized
activities. The latter offer was not acted on by the studios.
V. THE LITIGATION
A. The California Litigation
In 2002, DVD owners began hearing from distributors that the
motion picture industry was claiming that the 321 Software was
53. These measures are in contrast to the activities of the defendants in the Reimerdes and
Corley cases ("[T]he record clearly demonstrates that the chief focus of those promoting the
dissemination of DeCSS [was] to permit widespread copying and dissemination of unauthorized
copies of copyrighted works." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211,
223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Reimerdes 1") (emphasis added)).
54. In three years of operation, 321 Studios sold in excess of 750,000 copies of the 321
Software. With consumers making millions of backups, only two DVDs made with the 321
Software were alleged to have been placed on the black market.
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illegally allowing consumers to back up their purchased DVDs.' In
April 2002, after reading a newspaper article quoting a Motion
Picture Association of America ("MPAA") representative's statement
that its DVD Copy Plus and DVD X Copy were primarily intended to
facilitate the making of unlawful copies of DVDs and thus were
illegal devices under § 1201 of the DMCA, 321 Studios initiated a
lawsuit in the Northern District of California against eight motion
picture studios.55  321 Studios sought a declaratory judgment that,
contrary to that assertion, when consumers use the 321 Software they
are engaging in fair practices under the copyright law, including
activities permitted under §§ 107, 108, and 117.56 The studios filed a
motion for summary judgment. On February 20, 2004, nine months
after oral argument on the motion, Judge Susan Illston permanently
enjoined 321 Studios from distributing the 321 Software.57 On March
4, 2004 Judge Illston denied 321 Studios' motion to stay the
injunction pending appeal.58  321 Studios appealed to the Ninth
Circuit and also sought a stay of the preliminary injunction pending
appeal; the stay was denied pending full consideration of the appeal.59
B. The Copyright Office Rulemaking
While the California Litigation was pending, 321 Studios
participated in the Copyright Office's 2003 triennial rulemaking
proceeding on § 120160 by filing reply comments, 6' by providing a
witness at the request of the Register at the public hearing in
55. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Eighteen
months after the filing of the case in California (April 2002), Paramount and Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corporation sued 321 Studios in New York. See supra note 6 and infra Part V.C.
56. MGMStudios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1089-90.
57. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19,
2004) (order granting injunction).
58. Appellant's Motion and Memorandum Requesting Stay of Preliminary Injunction
Pending Appeal, 321 Studios v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (2nd Cit. 2004) (No. 04-1360).
59. 321 Studios v. United States D. N.D. of Cal., No. 04-15421 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2004)
(order denying stay of injunction pending appeal).
60. The Librarian of Congress and the Register of Copyrights initiated the second
rulemaking proceeding by publishing a Notice of Inquiry on October 15, 2002. The initial
comment period ended on December 18, 2002 and was followed by a reply comment period and
public hearings. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,578 (Oct. 15, 2002) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2002/67fr63578.html.
61. 321 Studios, LLC Reply Comments, In the Matter of Rulemaking from Prohibition on
Circumvention of Technological Measures That Control Access to Copyrighted Works, (Feb.
20, 2003) (No. RM 2002-04), available at http://www.copyright.gov/120l/2003/reply/021.pdf
(last visited Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter 321 Reply Comments].
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Washington, D.C., 62 and by responding in writing to a series of
questions posed by the Register directly to 321 Studios and other
commenters after conclusion of the public hearing phase of the
proceeding.63 321 Studios asked the Librarian to find that owners of
lawfully-acquired DVDs are or are likely to be adversely affected in
making non-infringing uses of their DVDs (i.e., the repair of damaged
DVDs and the making of archival, backup use copies), and that they
should therefore be exempt from the prohibition in § 1201(a)(1). 64
321 Studios provided the Register with extensive information
regarding the nature of DVDs, technological measures applied to limit
access to DVDs, the physical limitations of DVDs, and the experience
of customers of 321 Studios and others in being denied access to and
use of DVDs and the content embodied therein.65
321 Studios noted that in the 2000 proceeding, the Copyright
Office considered problems associated with DVDs, but declined to
62. Testimony of Robert Moore at Copyright Office Anticircumvention Rulemaking
Hearing (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/hearings/transcript-
may2.pdf.
63. Comments of 321 Studios, LLC in response to Copyright Office Questions, In the
Matter of Rulemaking from Prohibition on Circumvention of Technological Measures That
Control Access to Copyrighted Works (June 20, 2003) (No. RM 2002-04), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/post-hearing/postO9.pdf.
64. 321 Reply Comments, supra note 61, at 1.
65. In the 321 Reply Comments and Robert Moore's testimony, 321 Studios urged the
Register to recommend adoption of several exemptions under §1201(a)(l), including: "Class
No. 1: Literary and audiovisual works, including motion pictures, embodied in Digital Versatile
Disks (DVDs) that are or may become inaccessible by possessors of lawfully-obtained copies
due to malfunction, damage, or obsoleteness of either the access control mechanism or the
material object in which the work is embodied" and "Class No. 2: Literary and audiovisual
works, including motion pictures, embodied in Digital Versatile Disks (DVDs) whose access
control systems prohibit the creation of or access to replicas of the works." 321 Reply
Comments, supra note 61, at 1.
321 Studios also supported a number of other exemptions predicated upon fair use
and other noninfringing uses, including those relating to a) reproduction, distribution and use of
a work not subject to copyright, b) space-shifting of lawfully-obtained copies, c) creation of and
access to a replica or backup copy of a lawfully-obtained copyrighted work, d) performance in
conjunction with a playback device of one's own choosing, and e) use of a work imported from
any region in the world. Id. at 12-16.
In its request to the Copyright Office, 321 Studios argued that the rationales used to
support the exemption granted in 2000 for literary works protected by access control
mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage, or obsolescence were
equally relevant to 321 Studios' proposed exemption. Id. at 9-10.
321 Studios further stressed that, although the Copyright Office had limited the 2000
exemption to literary works, it acknowledged that problems adversely affecting users could
apply to other classes of works. Moreover, it pointed out, since DVDs may be classed as
audiovisual as well as literary works, it believed the current limitation should be expanded to
cover audiovisual works. Id. at 10.
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provide for a specific exemption. In the interim, according to 321
Studios, conditions had changed, making it necessary to revisit the
conclusion that no exemption was necessary.66  In 2000, the
Copyright Office had relied on the availability of an analog
alternative to DVD format.67  321 Studios pointed to growing
evidence that the distributors of movies were planning to phase out
VHS and that some titles were only available in DVD format.68 The
Copyright Office concluded in the 2000 proceedings that no
proponent of the argument for an exemption had demonstrated
substantial or concrete harm. 69 321 Studios appended to its comments
scores of declarations indicating that consumers are being adversely
affected in their ability to view works embodied in lawfully acquired
DVDs. 70 Additionally, the Copyright Office found in 2000 that it had
been presented with no explanation of the technological necessity for
circumventing access controls associated with DVDs in order to
circumvent the copy controls.7  321 Studios, by contrast, presented
evidence regarding consumer practices, arguing that
for consumers to fully protect and preserve their investment in
DVDs, they must take pro-active measures before the damage
renders the DVDs completely unusable, when access and use
controls are both fully operational. Even though products like 321
can salvage undamaged portions of the DVD, the pristine version
acquired by the consumer no longer exists once damage occurs.
Therefore, the copying must be done early enough to preserve the
lawfully acquired DVD.
72
Despite the evidence 321 Studios amassed in support of its
request, 73 neither the two classes of exemptions requested by 321
Studios, nor the other classes of exemptions supported by 321
Studios, were recommended by the Register or adopted by the
66. Id. at 10-12.
67. See 321 Reply Comments, supra note 61, at 10 (citing Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, Final Rule,
65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,568 n.12 (Oct. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 11 (citing Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,568 n. 13 (Oct.
27, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Appended to 321 Studios' request for an exemption were declarations from
consumers describing their use of 321 Software to make personal backup copies of their
lawfully-acquired DVDs. See supra note 52.
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Librarian.74 The denial appears to have been based in significant part
on the Register's reading of the decision in Corley75  and its
perception, in response to the argument that§ 1201 was being applied
to deny access to public domain works, that § 1201 was simply
inapplicable to those works.76
321 Studios' plans to appeal the decision of the Librarian were
tabled by the demands of the California Litigation and the New York
Litigation.
C. The New York Litigation
On November 13, 2003 Paramount Pictures Corporation and
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (the "NY Plaintiffs") 77 filed
suit against 321 Studios in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, seeking a preliminary injunction against its
continued sales of its DVD-copying software products. 78  The NY
74. For the administrative "final rule" recommended by the Register and issued by the
Librarian, see Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (Oct. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 201) [hereinafter Final Rule].
75. For example, "[e]xisting case law is clear that there is 'no authority for the
proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution,
guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the identical format of the original."'
Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights to James H. Billington, Librarian
of Congress 117 (Oct. 27, 2003) (citing Universal City Studios, Inc v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,
458 (2d Cir. 2001)), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommendation.pdf
[hereinafter Recommendation]. "As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has concluded, 'Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material
in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the format of the original."' Id. at
118 (citing Corley, 273 F.3d at 459). Corley is discussed in Part V.C.2.
76. "The author, publisher or distributor is simply precluded from claiming copyright on
a public domain work and is precluded from using section 1201(a)(1) from [sic] prevent
circumvention of technological protection measures placed on a public domain work."
Recommendation, supra note 75, at 100. The Final Rule did not address the need for an
exception in situations where public domain works were bundled with copyrighted works in a
single DVD.
77. Although the NY Plaintiffs were very familiar with the California Litigation, they
waited eighteen months to file their New York complaint, raising claims virtually identical to
those asserted by the California defendants in a counterclaim. 321 Studios argued that this
substantial delay negated the plaintiffs' claim of irreparable harm, a prerequisite for issuance of
a preliminary injunction. The District Court judge dismissed this issue without analysis.
78. In seeking a preliminary injunction the NY Plaintiffs relied on 17 U.S.C. §1203,
which provides that "[a]ny person injured by a violation of section 1201 ... may bring a civil
action in an appropriate United States district court," which "may grant temporary and
permanent injunctions on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a violation."
17 U.S.C. § 1203 (1998). One of 321 Studios' arguments to the Second Circuit was that the
District Court exceeded its authority by including in the preliminary injunction a prohibition on
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Plaintiffs alleged that 321 Studios was violating the "anti-trafficking"
provisions of the DMCA (both the access protection provisions of §
1201(a)(2) and the copy protection provisions of § 1201 (b)(1)),
relying on the decisions of the Second Circuit in Corley.79
1. Argument of NY Plaintiffs
The argument of the NY Plaintiffs rested on two assumptions: (i)
the software at issue in Corley was essentially the same as the 321
Software and (ii) Corley resolved the constitutionality of the § 1201
prohibitions as applied to fair use of copyrighted works and use of
public domain works. 321 Studios responded that neither of these
assumptions was correct.
2. The Corley Cases
In 2000, eight motion picture studios brought an action in the
Southern District of New York seeking to use § 1201 to enjoin Eric
Corley, Shawn Reimerdes and others from posting DeCSS on their
website and linking their site to other sites that post DeCSS. The
court granted a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from
posting DeCSS.80 Subsequent motions to expand the preliminary
injunction to linking were combined with a trial on the merits, and a
permanent injunction was issued against Corley on August 23, 2000
prohibiting him from posting DeCSS on his website or knowingly
linking via a hyperlink to any other website containing DeCSS.8' The
injunction was appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the
District Court.82 In affirming, the Second Circuit rejected three
constitutional challenges by Corley to the DMCA. Corley argued that
the DMCA violated the "limited times" requirement in the Copyright
Clause by allowing copyright owners to effectively obtain perpetual
protection by mixing public domain and copyrighted works in the
same encrypted format.83 The court rejected this argument for two
321 Studios' "encouraging the use of' the 321 Software. This prohibition ignores the further
language in §1203(b), which says, "but in no event shall [the court] impose a prior restraint on
free speech.., protected under the 1st amendment to the Constitution." 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)
(1998); Appellant's Motion and Memorandum Requesting Stay of Preliminary Injunction
Pending Appeal at 16, 321 Studios v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (2nd Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1360).
79. See infra Part V.C.2.
80. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
("Reimerdes F).
81. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
("Reimerdes IF').
82. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
83. See id. at 444-45.
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reasons. First, it was raised in a footnote and therefore not properly
before the court.84 Second, and significant for 321 Studios' case:
to whatever extent the argument might have merit at some future
time in a case with a properly developed record, the argument is
entirely premature and speculative at this time on this record.
There is not even a claim, much less evidence, that any Plaintiff
has sought to prevent copying of public domain works, or that the
injunction prevents the Defendants from copying such works. As
Judge Kaplan noted, the possibility that encryption would preclude
access to public domain works "does not yet appear to be a
problem, although it may emerge as one in the future."
85
Corley further argued that the DMCA as applied to his
dissemination of DeCSS violates the First Amendment because
computer code is "speech" entitled to full First Amendment
protection and the DMCA fails to survive the exacting scrutiny
afforded statutes that regulate "speech. 86  The Second Circuit,
holding that computer code conveying information is speech within
the meaning of the First Amendment,87 nevertheless found the
restriction on speech in that case to be content-neutral, rather than
content-based, and therefore applied the test of whether the restriction
served a substantial governmental interest, the interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and the regulation is narrowly
tailored.88 Had it found that the restriction was imposed because of
the content of the speech, a stricter standard of scrutiny would have
been required; i.e., whether the restriction served a compelling state
interest and did so by the least restrictive means available. 89 Finally,
the court addressed and rejected Corley's argument that the DMCA
violates the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause by unduly
obstructing the "fair use" of copyrighted materials. But, importantly
for 321 Studios, the court stated:
We need not explore the extent to which fair use might have
constitutional protection, grounded on either the First Amendment
84. Id.
85. Id. at 445 (quoting Reimerdes I1, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 338 n.245).
86. See id. at 451.
87. Id. at 449.
88. Corley, 273 F.3d at 450 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662
(1994)).
89. Id. at 450 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)). It should be noted, as well, that two types of activity were at issue in Corley-posting
and linking. The Second Circuit's analysis described above was set forth in the context of
posting. Because of the manner in which the injunction at issue was framed, the court found it
unnecessary to determine which standard should be applied to the defendants' linking activity.
2005]
580 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.. [Vol. 21
or the Copyright Clause, because whatever validity a constitutional
claim might have as to an application of the DMCA that impairs
fair use of copyrighted materials, such matters are far beyond the
scope of this lawsuit .... 90
3. Response of 321 Studios9'
In its opposition to the preliminary injunction motion, 321
Studios advanced several arguments to demonstrate that the NY
Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits.92 For purposes of
this article, we will focus on 321 Studios' contentions that, as
construed by the NY Plaintiffs (like the plaintiffs in the California
Litigation), the DMCA violates the First Amendment and the
Copyright Clause by preventing fair use of CSS-encrypted material
93
and access to public domain works.94 Unlike Corley, 321 Studios
90. Id. at 458-59.
91. Upon service of the New York Complaint, 321 Studios promptly moved to transfer
the case to the Northern District of California because of the duplicative nature of the claims and
to save time and resources. Judge Owen postponed this motion to the preliminary injunction
hearing but never allowed argument on the merits of the motion. The motion was denied in his
March 3, 2004 order issuing a preliminary injunction. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios,
No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306, *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3,2004).
92. As a preliminary matter, 321 Studios argued that the NY Plaintiffs were not entitled
to a preliminary injunction since they failed to demonstrate any irreparable harm. Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 14,
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004).
93. 321 Studios claimed that Sony compels the conclusion that making archival backup
copies of DVDs is a fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act. Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 33-34, Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 3, 2004).
94. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 21-27, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004). 321 Studios also advanced a statutory analysis of §
1201 to argue that the DMCA did not prohibit the 321 Software. Section 1201(b), which
regulates devices enabling violation of a copyright holder's rights, it claimed, was plainly
inapplicable to its case because CSS effectively controls access to, not copying of, DVDs. With
respect to § 1201 (a)(2), it relied on the definition of the phrase "circumvent a technological
measure" in § 1201(a)(3)(A); viz., to "descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted
work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure,
without the authority of the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a)(3)(A) (1998) (emphasis
added). By definition, 321 Studios claimed, any owner of an original DVD has the right to
access its content. Equally fundamental, 321 Studios argued, was that the sale of the 321
Software did not meet the conditions of §§ 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C), and therein lay the distinction
with Reimerdes and Corley. Factors present in its case, but not present in those cases were the
following: (i) the 321 Software is not primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumvention; (ii) the 321 Software has commercially significant purposes other than
circumvention, and (iii) the 321 Software is not marketed as a circumvention device. 321
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argued, the facts of its case required an exploration of the
constitutional issues.
95
4. Intervention of the U.S. Government
The U.S. Government filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit
for the stated purpose of defending the constitutionality of the
DMCA, and on February 2, 2004 the District Court granted the
motion.96 The Government's supporting memorandum in favor of the
Studios argued that both Corley and United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D.
Cal. 2002), also cited by the NY Plaintiffs, involved computer programs that arguably facilitated
the instant redistribution of copyrighted content over the Internet. The more appropriate
precedent, it claimed, was The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 292 F.
Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("Chamberlain"), aff'd (following the conclusion of the 321
litigation) 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In that case the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois determined on summary judgment that defendant Skylink Technologies did
not violate the DMCA by distributing universal garage door openers which were designed,
primarily used, and marketed to enable decryption of garage door software distributed by
Chamberlain, because homeowners who had purchased Chamberlain's garage door software had
implied authority to decrypt that software. Circumvention, 321 Studios argued, needs to be
equated with unauthorized access, not decryption. The Federal Circuit's subsequent affirmance
of the District Court's holding in Chamberlain, while distinguishing Corley, contains the
following supportive conclusion: "Copyright law itself authorizes the public to make certain
uses of copyrighted materials. Consumers who purchase a product containing a copy of
embedded software have the inherent legal right to use that copy of the software. What the law
authorizes, Chamberlain cannot revoke." The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d. 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
95. 321 Studios presented an extensive record of declarations and affidavits to support its
contention that the public needs the 321 Software to make fair use of copyrighted works on
DVD that are CSS-protected, as well as to access and copy CSS-protected public domain motion
pictures available on DVDs that are encrypted with CSS.
96. Appellant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction
Pending Appeal, 321 Studios v. Paramount Pictures Corp., (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2004) (No. 04-
1360). The Government asserted, inter alia, that 321 Studios did not have standing to assert the
rights of its customers in the context of this litigation, an assertion which 321 Studios countered
in its Memorandum and Reply Memorandum. Citing precedent noted as relevant by the Corley
court, 321 Studios identified a line of cases establishing that a party may challenge a statute on
overbreadth grounds where the statute may constitutionally be applied to the challenger, but is
susceptible of application in a manner that would violate the constitutional rights of third parties.
Appellant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending
Appeal at 9, 321 Studios v. Paramount Pictures Corp., (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2004) (No. 04-1360)
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059,
1083 (9th Cir. 1972) ("The First Amendment interests in this case are not confined to the
personal rights of Bursey and Presley. Although their rights do not rest lightly in the balance,
far weightier than they are the public interests in First Amendment freedoms that stand or fall
with the rights that these witnesses advance for themselves."); and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975)). 321 Studios also asserted that, even if the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA were not facially overbroad, it would have standing to assert the constitutional rights of
its customers based on the relationship between a vendor and its customers. Appellant's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at 9-11, 321
Studios v. Paramount Pictures Corp., (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2004) (No. 04-1360) (citing Singleton v.
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statute's constitutionality argued that the DMCA did not violate the
First Amendment because (i) the DMCA is content neutral; (ii) the
DMCA furthers important government interests, and (iii) the DMCA
is sufficiently tailored to satisfy constitutional requirements. The
Government also argued that Congress acted within its constitutional
authority when it enacted the DMCA and did not violate the
Copyright Clause and specifically the "limited times" provision of
that clause. Each of these arguments will be discussed in detail
below.
97
5. The Preliminary Injunction Hearing and Judge Owen's
Order
On February 5, 2004 a hearing was held on the preliminary
injunction. On March 3, 2004 Judge Owen issued an order granting
the motion of the NY Plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction against
321 Studios.98 The injunction was styled in a sweeping manner and
prohibited 321 Studios from selling the vast majority of its software
products, encouraging the use of its products, 99 helping customers in
the U.S. or abroad to use the software effectively and from
transferring funds abroad to pay licensors or vendors without prior
approval of the Court.100
The two-and-a-half page opinion, citing Reimerdes I, Reimerdes
II and Corley (and ignoring The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc.), 10 1 found that the conduct of 321 Studios was
"essentially identical to what this Court and the Second Circuit have
heretofor held violates the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA."'10 2  These cases, according to Judge Owen, answered the
constitutional issues raised by 321 Studios.'03
Wuff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (finding there to be standing where "the litigant is fully, or very
nearly, as effective a proponent.., and where there [are] obstacles to the third party's assertion
of its own rights")).
97. See infra Part VIA-B.
98. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004) (opinion and order granting preliminary injunction).
99. In its appeal brief 321 Studios argued that this aspect of the injunction prohibited
lawful speech in violation of its First Amendment rights. See supra note 78.
100. Paramount Pictures Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306, at *4.
101. See supra note 94.
102. The Order also indicated that the only purpose of the 321 Software is to circumvent
CSS. Paramount Pictures Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306, at *2.
103. However, at the hearing, the district court conceded that if customers of 321 Studios
may copy DVDs based on fair use grounds but are denied the tools to do so by the Order in this
action, that would pose a substantial issue for appeal:
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6. The Motion to Stay and Appeal to the Second Circuit
321 Studios immediately appealed to stay the preliminary
injunction pending its appeal to the Second Circuit on the grounds
that the injunction would ruin its business and that a favorable
decision on appeal would be of little significance if 321 Studios were
already out of business when it was issued. After a brief "automatic"
stay, Judge Owen reinstated the preliminary injunction on March 15,
2004 after oral argument. 321 Studios appealed the entry of the
preliminary injunction on March 19, 2004, and on March 22, 2004
filed a motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal.
On April 16, 2004 a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit
denied 321 Studios' motion to stay the preliminary injunction and
ordered an expedited briefing schedule for the appeal.'
0 4
Unfortunately, the circumstances 321 Studios predicted in its motion
to stay the preliminary injunction came to pass, and its business was
so devastated by the effects of the injunction and the costs of six
separate lawsuits 10 5 that it was forced to close down. The New York
Litigation and the California Litigation were subsequently settled by
the parties, leaving in place permanent injunctions. The inability of
321 Studios to prosecute its appeal left open the important
constitutional questions it had posed to the Second Circuit.
VI. ALTERING THE CONTOURS OF COPYRIGHT:
UNANSWERED CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
REGARDING THE DMCA
Two central questions were posed by the 321 Studios appeal: Is
Lutzker: There is also a Catch-22 which is clearly spelled out... again which
your Honor did not specifically address, but which I will describe in this
fashion .... and that is if a consumer has a fair use right to engage in decryption
but they can't acquire the tools to do it, is the law consistent with the
Constitution?
Court: Well, thinking about what you're telling me, you got a beauty there.
That's for the circuit and not for me.
Transcript of Mar. 15, 2004 Hearing at 9-10, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-
CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004).
104. 321 Studios v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., No. 04-1360 (2d. Cir. Apr. 16, 2004)
(order denying motion to stay injunction pending appeal).
105. Macrovision Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 04-CV-80, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8345
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2004); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004); 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307
F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004); DVD Copy Control Ass'n. v. 321 Studios, No. 04-CV-1203
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Atari, Inc. v. 321 Studios, No. 04-CV-4458 (RO) (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Warner
Home Video (UK) Ltd. v. Terr LLC, HC 03 CO 3102/4166 (2004).
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§ 1201 of the DMCA contrary to the First Amendment, and is § 1201
contrary to the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution? These
questions were left open by Corley, and the appropriate analysis to
answer them was set forth by the Supreme Court in two post-Corley
opinions.
A. The Eldred and Dastar Opinions
In its 2003 decision in Eldred, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the CTEA based on its observation that "copyright
law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations" in the form
of the "idea/expression dichotomy" and the fair use defense, and its
determination that these safeguards render further First Amendment
scrutiny of legislation unnecessary unless Congress seeks to alter the
traditional contours of copyright protection. 10 6 The Court stated:
The fair use defense affords considerable "latitude for scholarship
and comment"... and even for parody .... The First Amendment
securely protects the freedom to make -- or decline to make-
one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the
right to make other people's speeches. To the extent such
assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in
free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them. We
recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared
copyrights "categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment".... But when, as in this case, Congress has not
altered the traditional contours of copyrifht protection, further
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.
Later that year in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., the Supreme Court again addressed the Constitutional mandate
against perpetual copyright protection, this time making clear that
Congress may not indirectly "alter the contours of copyright" by
creating a species of rights that would be impermissible if conferred
directly in the form of copyright enhancements.' 0 8 In Dastar, the
owner of television rights in a copyrighted literary work alleged that
the producer of videocassettes embodying an earlier, public domain
television series based on the literary work, had violated § 43(a) of
the federal Lanham Act,' 09 which proscribes false designations of the
origin of goods, by marketing its videocassettes without
106. Eldred v. Ashcrofl, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
107. Id. at 220-21 (citations omitted).
108. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
109. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
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acknowledging that the production embodied therein relied heavily on
the earlier, public domain television series. 110 In holding that no false
designation of origin was shown because the tangible videocassettes
did in fact originate with the distributor, the Supreme Court noted that
copyright in a work subsists for "limited times," while protections
under the Lanham Act may be perpetual."' 1 Accordingly, to hold that
the Lanham Act's proscription on false designations of origin extends
to the intangible works embodied in tangible communicative products
would be akin to finding that the Lanham Act created a species of
perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.
112
B. Questions Left Unanswered by the Aborted 321 Studios
Cases
The Supreme Court decisions in Eldred and Dastar were issued
subsequent to the Southern District Court and Second Circuit
decisions in Corley. Thus, it was inappropriate for the district courts
in the New York Litigation and the California Litigation to rely on
Corley, without further analysis under Eldred and Dastar, for the
proposition that § 1201 of the DMCA does not raise constitutional
concerns. As matters eventuated for 321 Studios, by denying its
motions to stay the decisions in the California Litigation and the New
York Litigation, the circuit courts relinquished the opportunity to
determine whether § 1201 effected such a change in the contours of
copyright as to effectively eliminate the fair use defense in the case of
digital works protected by TPMs. Accordingly, the arguments
summarized below remain unaddressed.
1. Section 1201 Impermissibly Impinges on First
Amendment Protections
As argued by 321 Studios, if a user violates § 1201 by merely
accessing an encrypted copyrighted work, the traditional contours of
copyright law have been dramatically changed because a consumer
cannot exercise privileges conferred by the fair use defense without
incurring independent liability under § 1201. Furthermore, according
to 321 Studios, the DMCA constitutes an impermissible "back door"
regulation of speech by banning certain tools necessary to engage in
fair use of encrypted digital works. To the extent that the DMCA
bans the distribution of software designed to allow consumers to
110. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26-28.
111. Id. at 35-37.
112. Id. at 37 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003)).
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make fair use of DVD movies by creating works of art, editing out
material deemed offensive to their children, creating training films, or
preserving their collections and restoring DVDs to viewable form,
Congress has "altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection," and further First Amendment scrutiny is necessary.
1 13
Without using the 321 Software or software similar to it, there is no
practical way to make a high-quality copy of an excerpt from a movie
on a CSS-protected DVD, and it is impractical for a user to create and
manipulate digital files in the creation of a new, transformative
work. 
114
2. Section 1201 Violates the Copyright Clause
It is clear from the text of § 1201(a)(1) that a work in the public
domain is outside the scope of the DMCA. On its face, the statute
only applies to works "protected under this title."'1 15 Therefore, by
necessary inference, the public has a right to access, copy, and
manipulate the CSS-encrypted content that comprises every public
domain film. Indeed, even the Register of Copyrights recognized that
the DMCA does not prohibit circumvention of a TPM to access a
public domain work because such works are not works protected by
copyright.' 
16
However, if all software that decrypts CSS is banned under §
1201(a)(2) or 1201(b), then CSS-encrypted public domain works may
enjoy a perpetual copyright contrary to the limited times. proviso of
the Copyright Clause. Therefore, to preserve the constitutionality of
the DMCA, 321 Studios and other vendors must be understood as
having a right, concomitant to public rights in the public domain, to
traffic in tools that permit decryption of any TPM that controls access
113. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). Arguably, the required test is one of
strict scrutiny because denying users the tools to decrypt effectively controls how content can be
used in works that incorporate material protected by TPMs. See the discussion on the scope of
First Amendment protection for content-based vs. content-neutral restrictions, supra Part V.C.2.
114. Although the NY Plaintiffs claimed that one could train a video camera on a screen
playing a DVD and tape content off a television, this alternative would relegate a user to an
inferior copy (a camera-made version is grainier and does not compare in quality to the original
DVD) and potentially require investment in additional equipment to exercise this fair use right.
Moreover, a copy made in this manner would lack many of the original DVD's interactive
features. In Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Supreme Court considered the First
Amendment implications of analogous arguments. According to the Court, "one is not to have
the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place." 521 U.S. at 880 (citing Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington),
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
115. Digital Millennium Copyright Act §1, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A) (1998).
116. See supra note 76.
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to and copying of such works. Absent such a right, the DMCA would
seemingly violate the "limited times" provision of the Copyright
Clause in the U.S. Constitution.
C. A Proposed Legislative Solution: H.R. 107
On the opening day of the 108th Congress, Reps. Rick Boucher
and John Doolittle introduced the Digital Media Consumers' Rights
Act of 2003 (H.R. 107).117 The bill proposed amendment of the
Federal Trade Commission Act to require adequate labeling of copy-
protected CDs, as well as a series of copyright law amendments that
address the constitutional questions raised by the DMCA.' 18 Those
amendments would modify § 1201(c) by adding the following
language at the end of paragraph (1): "and it is not a violation of this
section to circumvent a technological measure in connection with
access to, or the use of, a work if such circumvention does not result
in an infringement of the copyright in the work," and by adding at the
end the following new paragraph: "It shall not be a violation of this
title to manufacture, distribute, or make noninfringing use of a
hardware or software product capable of enabling significant
noninfringing use of a copyrighted work."119
Since the legislation touched on trade and copyright law, it was
referred jointly to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
and the House Judiciary Committee. While a bill scaling back the
DMCA with respect to fair use did not have any traction in the House
Judiciary Committee, H.R. 107 was more sympathetically received in
the House Commerce Committee. 
120
Still, H.R. 107 did not receive much attention until 321 Studios
made a major push for legislative reform in the spring of 2004. That
effort, inspired by the California Litigation and the New York
Litigation, combined with efforts by a number of other entities long
117. Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (1st Sess.
2003).
118. Id. An additional fair use amendment contained in H.R. 107 would amend §§
1201(a)(2)(A) and 1201(b) by creating an exception to the prohibition for persons doing
scientific research into technological protection measures. Id. §5(a).
119. Id. § 5(b).
120. As a historical antecedent, it was during the DMCA debate that the House Commerce
Committee served as a counterbalance to the House Judiciary Committee and took the lead on
creating certain "user" protections, such as the § 1201(a)(1) triennial rulemaking proceeding.
See supra Part III.B. 1  It is also historically relevant that the Librarian of Congress expressed
concern for the survival of fair use and identified a need for legislative action in the context of
the 2000 rulemaking proceedings. See supra note 30. Despite the expressed concern, the
Librarian never proposed legislative reform.
2005]
588 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 21
interested in recalibrating the DMCA to strike a better balance for
users (such as computer equipment manufacturers, telecom/privacy
interests, copyright policy think-tanks, libraries and educators),
resulted in a public hearing on H.R. 107. At the hearing, Joe Barton
(R-TX), Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, expressed his support for the Boucher-Doolittle Bill and
suggested that action within his Committee was likely in the current
Congress. 121  However, shortly after the hearing, 321 Studios
announced it was going out of business. Soon thereafter, the
legislation quietly slipped out of the spotlight and died with the end of
the 108th Congress. That is not to say that even if 321 Studios had
remained in business H.R. 107 would have been adopted. The
proposed law faced intense opposition from content interests who
have aggressively challenged legislation designed to poke holes in
their digital copyright rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
With a bow to a classic American novel, it may be said that the
DMCA sets up a consumer "Catch-22." On the one hand, the public
is assured that nothing in the DMCA's anti-circumvention rules will
inhibit the robust exercise of fair use and other exemptions long part
of the balance of copyright law. Moreover, § 1201 by its own terms
only applies to copyrighted works.
121. 321 Studios' Robert Moore testified at the 2004 Hearing on the devastating impact of
the litigation on his business and the need for legislative restoration of fair use of digital works.
The Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 108th Cong., May 12, 2004 ("2004 Hearing")
(testimony of Robert Moore, Chief Executive Officer, 321 Studios), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/05122004hearing1265/Moore l996.htm.
Among others testifying in favor of the bill was Stanford University professor and constitutional
law expert Lawrence Lessig, who stated:
This correction to the DMCA is long overdue. It is necessitated first by the
limited authority granted to Congress under the Copyright and Patent Clause. As
the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed, Congress's power under the
Copyright & Patent Clause is limited. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5
(1966) (clause "both a grant of power and a limitation"). As it has recently
indicated in Eldred v. Ashcroft, among those limits is "fair use." Slip Op. at 30.
Yet the DMCA, as interpreted, plainly interferes with the effective exercise of
"fair use." And if Congress is restrained by the First Amendment to include "fair
use" in the Copyright Act, it is constrained by the First Amendment not to
exclude it through other copyright-related rules.
The Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 108th Cong., May 12, 2004 ("2004 Hearing")
(testimony of Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/05122004hearingl265/Lessig I 985.htm.
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The reality, on the other hand, is quite different. As a result of
the injunctions against 321 Studios, the DMCA's guarantee of fair use
and unrestricted access to public domain works is rendered
ineffectual. The interpretations of the DMCA by the district courts in
New York and California challenge the constitutional premises that
ensure the delicate balance of rights and limitations that are essential
to copyright law. The 321 Studios test cases offered an opportunity
for higher courts to rigorously assess these issues. Unfortunately,
with the demise of 321 Studios, the effort was cut short.

